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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
AND
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Jurisdiction in this Court rests on Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3) (e) which vests jurisdiction in this Court to review
all final orders and decrees in cases originating in the Board
of State Lands.

(The "Board.")

The proceedings below, before the Board and the
Director of the Division of State Lands and Forestry (the
"Director" and "Division"), consisted of the filing,
consideration and approval of an application by Garfield County
for a land exchange.

In that exchange, the County sought to

acquire a section of State land which had originally been
granted to the State of Utah under § 6 of the Utah Enabling
Act, 28 Stat. 107, 109.

The section in question is located

within Capitol Reef National Park.
included:

Agency action also

denial of a petition to intervene in the exchange

proceedings filed by the National Parks and Conservation
Association ("NPCA," the petitioner); denial of NPCA requests
to defer decision pending opportunity for investigation; denial
of certain NPCA requests for declaratory rulings filed under
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-15, relating to issues raised by the
exchange proceedings; and issuance of one requested declaratory
ruling stating certain standards governing the Board or
Division's decision on the proposed land exchange.

On September 11, 1987, the Board approved the land
exchange "in concept," subject to the County's fulfillment of
certain further conditions.

On December 21, 1987, the Director

of the Division of State Lands and Forestry formally approved
the exchange; and pursuant to that approval, the Governor
executed a patent conveying the land to the County on December
24, 1987.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Director of the Division unlawfully

denied NPCAfs request to intervene in proceedings pending
before the Board and Division on an application by Garfield
County for approval of a land exchange by which it proposed to
acquire a State school section within Capitol Reef National
Park in exchange for certain County lands (the "Capitol Reef
land exchange").
2.

Whether the Director of the Division unlawfully

denied NPCATs procedural requests to defer decision on the
application pending public notice, access to further
information, and opportunity to review the Director's reply to
NPCATs requests for declaratory rulings.
3.

Whether, in response to NPCA's requests for

declaratory rulings pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 65-46a-15, the
Director of the Division erred in holding that legal standards
governing decision on the Capitol Reef land exchange required
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that "when there is a choice between two actions, both of which
provide some measure of economic benefit to beneficiaries of
the school trust," decision must prefer the option that will
generate the "greater economic advantage11 and may not give
weight to other statutorily-mandated management policies that
require or permit protection of significant scenic, aesthetic
and recreational values such as the "multiple use/sustained
yield" policy of Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14 and the policies
against impairment or derogation of national parks prescribed
by 16 U.S.C.A. § 1 and la-1.
4.

Whether the Board and Director, in approving the

Capitol Reef laid exchange, erred in failing to make factual
and legal determinations required by applicable legal
standards, including those stated in the Director's reply to
NPCAfs request for declaratory rulings, particularly:
(a)

The failure to determine whether application

of "trust" management concepts were considered by the Board or
Director to require approval of the Capitol Reef land exchange,
and failure to make factual determinations necessary to apply
those concepts.
(b)

The failure to determine whether, and the

extent to which, the Capitol Reef section may or must be
managed to preserve the scenic, aesthetic and recreational
values and resources on or proximate to that section in
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accordance with the "multiple use/sustained yield" principles
prescribed by Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14 and/or the nonimpairment
requirement of the National Park Service Organic Act, as
amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1 and la-1 (1974 and West Supp. 1987).
(c)

The failure to determine whether feasible

management options were available which, without material
economic disadvantage, through land exchange or other
administrative disposition, would have permitted or assured
compliance with protective statutory standards or policies
applicable to the Capitol Reef section through conveyance to
the National Park Service in return for acquisition of other
lands to be managed for economic return.
(d)

The failure to determine the extent to which

election of management options for the Capitol Reef section
designed to preserve its scenic, aesthetic and recreational
values would benefit future members of the open class of trust
beneficiaries by protecting and preserving long-term trust
asset values.
(e)

The failure to determine whether management

designed to preserve the scenic, aesthetic and recreational
values on or related to the Capitol Reef section in compliance
with other protective statutory policies would generate
sufficient long-term or short-term economic benefit to satisfy
trust obligations.
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(f)

The failure to give consideration and effect

to the Board's previously-adopted policies recited in Division
of State Lands and Forestry, "Surface Policies" (1966 through
December 1986), including its policy titled "Management of
Sensitive Areas" (§ 1.600) and its policy titled "Environmental
Assessments" (§1.400-1.411).
(g)

The failure to determine or resolve other

material substantive and procedural issues concerning the
proposed exchange that had been identified by members of the
Board, Division staff, officials of the U.S. National Park
Service and others in the course of the exchange proceedings.
5.

Whether the decision to approve the Capitol Reef

land exchange was unlawfully made or participated in by the
Board, in violation of this Court's holding in Adkins v.
Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524 (1986), which determined
that the Board's statutory power was limited to policy making
and (with limited exceptions) did not include application of
policy to specific facts or rendering individual case decisions.
6.

Whether the Director of the Division unlawfully

declined to respond to certain requests for declaratory rulings
filed by NPCA pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-15 that were
relevant to the lawfulness of the decision to approve the
Capitol Reef land exchange.
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7.

Whether the action of the Board and the Division

approving the Capitol Reef land exchange and the patent
conveying the Capitol Reef section to the County should be
invalidated and remanded for proceedings in accordance with law
if the above issues, or any of them, are determined in favor of
NPCA.
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
(1)

§6 of Enabling Act

(2)

Art. XX, Utah Constitution

(3)

Utah statute on multiple use, §65-1-14

(4)

National Park Service Organic Act, nonimpairment

provision, 16 USC §§ 1 and la-1
(5)

Division of State Lands and Forestry, Surface

Policies, continaing minutes of Board of State Lands meeting
June 14, 1984 approving §1.600 "Management of Sensitive Areas"
and minutes of Board of State Lands meeting July 19, 1978
approving §1.400 "Environmental Assessments".
(6)

In re Declaratory rulings:

UCA § 63-46a-15 and

Board of State Lands procedural rules R632-7-1 through
R632-7-5, together with definitions appearing in §63-46a-2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition Below
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This case arises on a Petition for Review filed by the
National Parks and Conservation Association ("NPCA")
challenging the administrative proceedings and decisions of the
Board of State Lands (the"Board") and of the Director of the
Division of State Lands and Forestry (the "Director" and
"Division") in approving a land exchange sought in an
application filed by intervenor Garfield County, Utah (the
"County").
By application dated April 23, 1987, the County sought
approval of a land exchange by which it proposed to acquire a
state "school section" within Capitol Reef National Park by
proffering in exchange certain other land owned by the
country.

(The "Capitol Reef land exchange.")

[R. 5-7]

On

September 11, 1987, at a scheduled meeting, but without any
published or other general public notice of the proposed land
exchange the Board approved the proposed exchange "in concept,"
subject to certain further proceedings and conditions.
54]

[R.

At that meeting an NPCA representative, in written and

oral statements, presented certain substantive and procedural
objection to the exchange.

NPCA requested deferral of any

decision pending adequate notice to interested citizens,
opportunity to obtain information concerning the proposed
exchange, and opportunity to participate before the Board, with
appropriate formal administrative proceedings.
52-53]
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[R. 41, R.

On October 14, 1987, NPCA filed a letter "petition to
intervene" in the continuing proceedings [R. 61-64], and a
letter requesting that the Board or Division render certain
declaratory rulings pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-15
concerning issues raised by the pending land exchange
application.

[R. 65-71]

NPCA further requested that action on

the exchange be deferred for 30 days following issuance of the
requested declaratory rulings, to permit it "to file a
response, identify any factual issues for appropriate
evidentiary proceedings, and offer applicable legal argument."

[R. 64]
On November 16, 1987, the Director of the Division
denied NPCATs petition to intervene [R. 74-75j.

On December

21, the Director responded to NPCATs requests for declaratory
rulings, denying or refusing to respond to, all but one of
NCPA?s nine requests.

[R. 83-87]

Also on December 21, 1987,

pursuant to the Board's decision on September 11, 1981, the
Director took formal action approving the Capitol Reef land
exchange [R. 89], sub silentio denying NPCATs request that
final action be deferred pending opportunity respond after
review of the requested declaratory rulings. On December 24,
1987, pursuant to the Director's formal approval, the Governor
executed a patent conveying the Capitol Reef school section to
the County.
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2.

Statement of the Facts
A.

The Capitol Reef Section:
Context

Background and

The land that is the subject of this disputed land
exchange is section 16, T34S, R8#, SLB&M.

[R. 5; R. 7]

acquired by the State of Utah pursuant to the "school section"
grants effected by § 6 of the Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107,
109 (Act of July 16, 1984).

Because Section 16 is located

within the exterior boundaries established by the legislation
which created Capitol Reef National Park, 16 U.S.C.A. § 273
(1974), 85 Stat. 739 (Public Law 92-207, Dec. 18, 1971), it is
hereafter referred to as the "Capitol Reef section."
The Capitol Reef section occupies a scenically
spectacular and strategically critical location with Capitol
Reef National Park, embracing virtually all of the "Waterpocket
Fold" at the point where it is traversed, in a series of
"switchbacks" by the much-disputed dirt road known as the "Burr
Trail."
Areas on both the north and south side of the Burr
Trail where it traverses the Capitol Reef section have been
recommended by the National Park Service for wilderness
designation.

The areas recommended for wilderness designation

are the Wagon Box Mesa unit (Unit #2) to the south and the Red
Canyon unit (Unit #3) to the north
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[See map titled "Exhibit A,

Wilderness Plan, Capitol Reef National Park," copies from
United States Department of the Interior, National Park
Service, "Wilderness Recommendation, Capitol Reef National
Park/Utah" (November 1974).

This map appears as pages 36-37 of

Appendix 7 to Petitioner's Motion to Supplement The
Administrative Record.]
The recommended Wagon Box Wilderness unit, at its
north end near the Burr Trail (and Section 16) was described by
the National Park Service as follows:
Near the north is the mount of Muley Twist
Canyon, which has been cut deeply into the rocks
for 20 tortuous, twisting miles. Twelve miles
are in this unit. This is excellent hiking
country. A rainbow of rock colors can be seen
within its walls-white, red, purple, green, gray,
brown, and finally yellow where it has cut
through solid Navajo Sandstone on the way to its
mouth in Grand Gulch.
Id. at 31.

Access to premier hiking and scenery of Muley

Twist Canyon is available to Park visitors where that canyon
cuts through the section and across the Bur Trail, both to the
north and south.

Recognizing both the beauty and vulnerability

of the area, the Park Service commented:
This unit is the most outstanding of all four
wilderness designations, and also the one most
fragile and susceptible to damage by outside
influences because of its narrowness.
Id. at 31.

The Park Service also recognized that the Red

Canyon unit (Unit #3) like unit 2, is ideally suited for
wilderness backcountrv use . . . .ff
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Id. at 32.

The Capitol Reef section is also strategically
important in the continuing public dispute concerning Garfield
County's efforts to pave the "Burr Trail," opposed by NPCA and
other conservation organizations.

Paving of the switchbacks

that descend the Waterpocket Fold, entirely within the Capitol
Reef section, has been one of the major focal points of that
dispute.

All of the County Commissioners of Garfield County

have expressed their intention to press for paving of the
entire road, including the portion within the Park, although
the controversy currently has concentrated on the portion of
the Burr Trail extending west of the Park boundary to Boulder,
Utah.
The immediate relevance of the paving dispute to this
case arises because there are undisputed indications, expressly
acknowledged by the Board, that a major factor in this land
exchange was Garfield County's effort to use the Capitol Reef
section as "leverage" to force Congress to release funds for
paving that were included in a 1985 appropriation bill, but
withheld "subject to authorization."

Thus, although $8.1

million was appropriated, the specific condition required
proponents to obtain a further authorization bill before funds
would be available for road construction.

See H.J. Res. 465,

131 Cong. Rec. at H12038 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1985) (continuing
appropriation resolution for fiscal 1986).
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[Attached as

Appendix 3 to Petitioner's Motion to Supplement Administrative
Record.]
The administrative record contains substantial
indications of the Board's affirmative participation in the use
of this land exchange to assist Garfield County's efforts in
using the Capitol Reef section as a

?f

lever?f to force release of

the paving monies.
Most explicitly, in the course of the Board's
consideration of the exchange proposal, a representative of the
Wilderness Society observed that -in an article in the Salt Lake Tribune of
September 3, it was noted that the land could be
used as leverage for authorizing the freeing-up
of the money for paving the Burr Trail.1
In response, without contest or question by other Board members
or by the Garfield County Commissioner (who was present),
Mr. Bates, of the Board, asked if the Wilderness
Society was willing to go to the people in
Congress who are blocking the appropriated monies
and get them released. Garfield County has been
very up-front with their proposal of why they
want these lands. They only want to get the road
paved. [R 53-54]
In addition to the above, there were other explicit
indications in the record that the Board's response to the

1 The article referred to, by Salt Lake Tribune
reporter Jim Woolf, titled "Garfield Hopes to Land Burr Trail
Funds by Trading Acres," published Sept. 3, 1987, is included
as Appendix 8 to Petitioner's Motion To Supplement The
Administrative Record, in order to provide the context for the
above comment and the ensuing Board member's response.
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proposed exchange was strongly influenced by the County's
political objectives.

A memorandum to the Board by the

Division staff expressly acknowledged that "in several respects
existing policy does not apply to this proposal."

[R. 36]

The

memorandum, as well as Board discussion, repeatedly
acknowledged conflict with a prior policy, established through
a "Memorandum of Understanding" ("MOU") executed by Governor
Ganberter and by Secretary of the Interior Hodel, designed to
provide "for the removal of State sections from national parks
. . . through Federal Land Policy and Management Act exchange
procedures."

[R. 31; R. 34-35; R. 43; R. 46-47; R. 49-53]

Despite that basic and admitted conflict, the Division Staff
and the Director repeatedly attempted to justify the policy
conflict with the MOU on the basis of "assumptions" and
undocumented representations that the County would eventually
convey the Capitol Reef section to the Park Service.

[R. 34;

R. 47; R. 49-51; R. 54]
Finally, the specific involvement of the agencies in
the County's political maneuvers is revealed by one of the two
grounds on which the management option of "private sale" was
rejected.

That alternative was expressly rejected not only

because it would "only provide appraised value," but also
because it "may prevent effective control by the County . . .
."

[R. 36; R. 49]
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B.

The Initial Agency Proceedings

By application dated 23 April, 1987, Garfield County
applied to the Division of State Lands and Forestry for
approval of a proposed land exchange by which the County would
acquire Section 16, T34S, R8E, SLB&M (the "Capitol Reef
section") owned by the State of Utah pursuant to the "school
section" grants effected by § 6 of the Utah Enabling Act, 28
Stat. 107, 109.

[R. 5; R. 7]

In exchange for acquisition of

that section, the County proposed to convey certain
County-owned properties.

No public notice of the proposed

exchange, or notice of availability of documents analyzing or
implementing the exchange, was provided to the public,
including NPCA.2
On September 11, 1987, the proposed Garfield County
land exchange was considered at a scheduled meeting of the
Board of State Lands.

At that meeting, a representative of

NPCA offered oral and written statements opposing the exchange

2 NPCA learned of the pending exchange application
shortly before the Board's meeting on September 11, 1987,
through review of the agenda of the Utah Resource Development
Coordinating Committee. The key Division memo dated July 27,
1987, summarizing and analyzing the exchange [R. 42-54] was
made available to NPCA, only after repeated requests, in Moab,
Utah, the evening before the Board meeting. See Affidavit of
Terri Martin, Appendix A to Petitioner's Motion to Supplement
the Record.

-14-

on substantive and procedural grounds.

Emphasizing that there

"has been failure to give adequate notice to the public for its
opportunity to provide comments/1 [R. 53] NPCA requested that
consideration of the matter

,T

be deferred pending appropriate

notice and opportunity for citizens, including ourselves, to
obtain further information regarding the proposed exchange.ff

[R. 41]
Material substantive and procedural issues concerning
the proposed exchange were identified at or prior to the
September 11, 1987, meeting by members of the Board, by the
Division staff, by NPCA, by officials of the U.S. National Park
Service and others.

[R. 39-41; R. 44; R. 46; R. 54]

Without

addressing or explaining its resolution of any of those issues,
either on September 11 or in any subsequent meeting or
document,3 the Board acted to approve the exchange "in
concept."

[R. 54]

That decision, however, provided for

further proceedings on the exchange because the Division staff
had raised doubt about the propriety of accepting the lands
proffered in exchange by the County unless those lands

3 Specific material issues identified in the agency
proceedings but not explained or resolved by the Board or
Division are summarized, infra pp. 20-23 under the heading
"Final approval of the land exchange and failure to state the
grounds for decision and identified issues"
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represented greater than "equal value" [R. 49], and the County
had indicated willingness to identify additional property for
exchange.

[R. 47]

Thus, the Board's approval was made

"subject to further evaluation of the County's offer to ensure
. . . better that [sic] equal value."
C.

[R. 54]

Denial of NPCA's Petition to Intervene

On October 14, 1987, NPCA filed a letter styled as a
"petition to intervene" in the still-pending land exchange
proceeding.

[R. 61-64]

The petition alleged NPCA's grounds

for standing and interest in the proceedings, and identified
certain issues that NPCA sought to pursue as intervenor,
relating to potential impacts on and protection of Capitol Reef
National Park.

NPCA's petition noted that "the information and

evidence before the Division and Board is limited to internal
memoranda and additional information submitted to the Board by
Garfield County.,f

[R. 63]

NPCA emphasized that it sought to present evidence and
argument to redress the agencies' failure to consider
protection of the unique values of Capitol Reef National Park,
the interest of Utah citizens in preserving those values, and
the grounds on which protection of the non-economic values of
the Capitol Reef section would be consistent with maintaining
the integrity of the state's trust responsibility for those
lands.

[R. 63]

NPCA also sought opportunity to respond and to
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identify disputed factual issues after opportunity to review
the Director's reply to its simultaneous "requests for
declaratory rulings" on certain key issues, requesting 30 days
for that purpose.

[R. 64]

NPCAfs petition to intervene was denied by the
Director in letters dated November 16, 1987, [R.17; R.18]
stating the following basis for denial:
Currently, the Division . . . has no procedures
under which a request for intervention in the
consideration of an exchange proposal might be
granted. In fact, consideration of an exchange
application by the Division is not viewed as an
adjudicative action under present law. Rather,
it is in the nature of a proposal for
negotiation. . . .
At present, we see no basis
for interjection of a third party into such a
negotiation process. [R. 74; R. 75]
In denying petitioner's petition to intervene, the
Director did not question or contest petitioner's allegations
concerning its "standing" and interest in the proceedings.
Advising that "the negotiations are nearly complete," he
invited NPCA to submit "any information related to the value of
the affected properties or any alternative which you may have
to offer."

[R. 74; R. 75]

He also failed to respond to

petitioner's requests that decision on the exchange be deferred
pending opportunity for notice to the public, for
investigation, and for response in light of the interpretations
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and policies reflected in the anticipated reply to NPCA's
requests for declaratory rulings.
D.

Disposition of NPCA?s Requests For
Declaratory Rulings

Concurrently with its petition to intervene, on
October 14, 1987, NPCA also filed certain

fT

requests for

Declaratory Rulings11 with the Board and Division [R. 65-71]
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-15 and Board of State Lands
procedural rules R632-7-1 through R632-7-5.

The requests for

declaratory rulings explained the reasons why the rulings were
needed and sought the agencies' interpretations of statutory
and/or constitutional requirements and policies on certain
procedural and substantive issues material to the proposed land
exchange.

Emphasizing the importance of the requested rulings

to meaningful participation in the exchange proceedings, NPCAfs
concurrent petition to intervene emphasized that it "cannot
effectively participate in the pending proceedings or protect
its rights and interests until determination of the requested
declaratory rulings."

[R. 64]

For that reason, NPCA requested

opportunity to defer further response to the exchange proposal
until it could review the reply to those requests.

[R. 64]

The Director replied to NPCA's requests for
declaratory rulings by letter on December 21, 1876 [R. 83-87],
declining to rule on all but one of the requests.
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The

technical legal grounds for that declination are analyzed and
challenged at pages 52-55 of this brief.
E.

Declaratory Ruling on Consistency of
"trust1* Management of Responsibilities With
Protections of Unique Values on the Capitol
Reef Section

Prompted by repeated Board and Division staff
invocation of a generalized "trust management" obligation to
maximize revenues from school trust lands [R. 33-34; R. 45-47;
see also R. 28; R. 58], NPCATs requests for declaratory rulings
had sought to determine the agencies1 interpretation of the
legal content of that concept, as applied to the Capitol Reef
section.
Specifically referring to the Capitol Reef land
exchange, NPCATs request for declaratory rulings sought to
determine -whether the applicable statutes, rules, board
policies or other authorities permit or require
consideration and protection of the unique,
long-term scenic, aesthetic and recreational
values of state lands in making decisions
affecting the disposal of those lands. . . . [R.
28]
In particular, declaratory ruling request #7 inquired
concerning the extent to which management to preserve the
unique scenic, aesthetic and recreational values and resources
of the Capitol Reef section may be consistent with the
agencies' concept of the legal content and effect of any
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"trust" obligation to generate economic return from the
management: or disposition of that land.

[R. 71, paragraph or

request #7]
The Director's reply did provide a declaratory ruling
setting forth his interpretation of certain "trust management"
concepts [R. 84-87].

That declaratory ruling is analyzed, and

challenged in part, in section V.6 of this Brief.
However, the role or effect of those concepts, as
interpreted by the Director, on the decision to approve the
capitol Reef land exchange cannot be determined because no
meaningful statement of the grounds for decision has ever been
made available by the Board and Division.

Nor have any factual

determinations ever been provided that resolve, or even
address, the considerations recited by the declaratory ruling
as governing the agencies1 "trust" obligations in the context
of the Capitol Reef land exchange.
F.

Final approval of the land exchange and
failure to state the grounds for decision
on identified issues

The Director took formal action approving the proposed
exchange on December 21, 1987, expressly acting on the premise
that "the Board approved the concept of exchanging State land"
in accordance with the County's proposal.

[R. 89]

The only

decision document was a one-page report of the Director's final
approval, which included a summary of appraised values
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purporting to show that the County had proffered other or
additional land sufficient to equal 150% of appraised value of
the Capitol Reef section.

[R. 89]

The basis for the latter

determination is not otherwise reflected in the administrative
record; nor was it ever noticed or made available to NPCA or to
the public.
Thus, no statement of facts and reasons, statement of
grounds for decision, or other explanation has ever been
prepared or provided in support of the Board's or Director?s
decision to approve the Capitol Reef land exchange.

Because of

the failure to provide any meaningful decision document, many
material substantive and procedural issues that were identified
in the course of the exchange proceedings were left unresolved,
and no explanation for their resolution has been made public.
The need for a meaningful decision document had been
asserted in a latter dated December 18, 1987, in which NPCA had
"specifically request[ed] that prior to any approval, you
address and state the basis for your resolution of the issues
raised below."

Emphasizing that "the exchange raises important

issues that have not been considered or resolved,,f the letter
had listed and explained a number of these issues and their
relevance to the Capitol Reef land exchange.

[R. 76-77]

Although most of the issues presented by NPCA had been raised
in the declaratory ruling requests and other submissions and
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questions already before the Board and Division, the Director
simply declined to respond, on the ground that NPCA's letter
"was not received until December 24, 1987, . . . three days
after the approval of the exchange."

(The same date that the

Governor executed a patent deed conveying the Capitol Reef
section to Garfield County.)
Furthermore, many of the material issues had been
identified in the course of the proceedings by members of the
Board, Division staff, officials of the U.S. National Park
Service, and others, as well as by NPCA's representative, and
are reflected in the administrative record.
The material issues left unresolved by the Director's
one-page final decision document, discussed in more detail in
sections of this brief which follow, include:
(1)

Probable impacts on the scenic, aesthetic

and recreational values and resources of the Capitol Reef
section and of related areas of Capitol Reef National Park,
either from the County's development or use of the section [R.
39; R. 48; R. 50-53], or from successful use of the section as
"leverage" to force release of funds that Congress had
authorized but not yet appropriated for paving of the Burr
Trail.
(2)

Inconsistency of the proposed exchange with

a comprehensive "Memorandum of Understanding Between The
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Department of the Interior and The State of Utah" expressly
designed to implement land exchanges by which the State would
dispose of unmanageable state school sections within federal
reservations, and in exchange acquire consolidated and more
manageable holdings from the Department.

(Attached as Appendix

4 to Motion To Supplement The Administrative Record.)

[Issue

discussed in Administrative Record at, e.g., R. 31-32; R.
40-41; R. 43; R. 47; R. 50; R. 52; R. 77-78]
(3)

Substantial indications that purposes other

than benefit to the school trust played a significant role in
the Board's approval of the exchange.
(4)

The basis for a related, unsupported

"assumption" that the County eventually intended to turn the
Capitol Reef section over to the U.S. National Park Service.
[R. 34; R. 47; R. 49; R. 51]
(5)

The impropriety of the Board's role in the

specific land exchange decision under this Court's ruling in
Adkins v. Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524 (Utah, 1986).

[R. 53]
(6)

The impropriety of relying on appraisals

solicited and submitted by the County rather than obtained or
conducted independently by the Board and Division.
31; R. 68-69; R. 80]
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[R. 9; R.

G.

Issuance of patent conveying title to the
Capitol Reef section to Garfield County

NPCA is informed that a patent to the Capitol Reef
section was executed by the Governor on December 24, 1987,
implementing the land exchange as finally approved on December
21, 1987.

Neither a copy of the patent nor any statement,

recommendation or other transmittals to or by the Governor are
included in the certified Administrative Record, but have been
requested in NPCA's accompanying Motion to Supplement The
Administrative Record.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

1.

J jurisdiction

NPCA is confident that this Court has jurisdiction
over this action, based on the arguments previously submitted
in response to the State's Motion to Dismiss.

Those arguments

are merely supplemented hereby the submission of an affidavit
dated April 7, 1988, executed by Professor Ronald N. Boyce,
attached as Appendix 2 to Petitioner's Motion to Supplement
Administrative Record.
2.

NPCA Was Unlawfully Denied Opportunity for
Effective Participation in the Capitol Reef Land
Exchange Proceedings
A.

NPCA's Petition to Intervene was Unlawfully
Denied

The Director of the Division of State Lands and
Forestry unlawfully denied petitioner's request to intervene in
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pending agency proceedings on the proposed Capitol Reef Land
Exchange.
(a)

No question was raised about the timeliness

of petitioner's request to intervene, about the substantiality,
legal relevance or lack of representation of the interests
petitioner sought to protect, or about petitioner's standing to
assert those interests; and where
(b)

The only grounds stated for denial of

intervention were that the Division "has no procedures'1 for
intervention in exchange proceedings and that there is "no
basis for interjection of a third party" into land exchange
proceedings because they involve a "negotiation process" rather
than an "adjudicative action."

R. 74; R. 75.

The Director's characterization is directly contrary
to Utah law on this point.

§63-46b-l(a) defines reviewable

adjudicative proceedings as:
"all state agency actions that determine the
legal rights, duties, priviledges, immunities or
other legal interests of one or more identifiable
persons. . . . "
This definition is consistent with the case law definition
which preceded the Administrative Procedures Act Adkins v.
Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1986).
The Director's determination that the Division was
free to proceed as if it were a private party negotiating a
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home sale is inconsistent not only with the Division's
responsibility as a governmental agency, with its own declared
position regarding petitioner's requests.

Contrary to his

declaration that petitioner had no right to intervene, the
Director concluded that petitioner had shown sufficient
interest in the transaction that he was required to respond to
ruling #7 requested by petitioner [R. 84-87].
B.

NPCATs Request to Defer Decision Pending
Opportunity for Notice, Investigation and
Review of Declaratory Rulings was
Improperly Denied

The refusal of the Board and Division to acknowledge
that they have obligations beyond negotiating a private
property transaction is particularly offensive in this case
given the fact that the state land in question is within a
national park.

The important policy questions resulting from

that fact were brought to the attention of the Board and
Division before, during, and after the September 11 meeting at
which the land exchange was approved 'fin concept."

Indeed,

some of the most significant issues raised by this fact were
identified in the course of the Board's own internal analysis
of the proposed exchange.

That document dated July 27, 1987

and described in respondent's certification of the record as
"Division Advisory Briefing Memorandum for Board of State Lands
and Forestry'' expressly recognizes that the proposed exchange
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raises issues regarding compliance with the Board's trust
obligations [R. 33]; regarding conflict with the memorandum of
understanding between the state and the Department of Interior
[R. 34]; and regarding conflict with the National Park Service
regarding impact of the proposed exchange on the National Park
[R. 35]. Before the exchange was actually made, additional
issues were brought to respondent's attention, including
questions regarding the application of the Board's own policy
statement regarding management of sensitive lands [R. 71].
Petitioner requested that these issues be reviewed, with
opportunity for a full presentation of views, before the
exchange was carried out [R. 62-64],
Despite the acknowledged presence of these important
issues, the Board and Division refused to defer the decision as
requested and proceeded to conduct the exchange as if they were
private parties.

Agency decisions made in the absence of

announced, ascertainable standards are invalid under Utah law.
Athay v. State Dept. of Business Regulations, 626 P.2d 965,
966-67 (Utah, 1981).

This is particularly true here where the

Board has simply refused to face up to its responsibility to
weigh, evaluate, and issue the kind of policy decisions which
are its responsibility under Adkins v. Div. of State Lands,
719 P.2d 524 (Utah, 1986).
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3.

The Director's Declaratory Ruling Erred in
Holding that Management Decisions Affecting the
Capitol Reef Section Must Prefer Options
Providing the "Greater Economic Advantage"
Regardless of Federal or State Statutory
Policies that Permit or Require Protection of
Unique Scenic, Aesthetic and Recreational Values
A.

NPCA?s declaratory ruling request on trust
management obligations

In initial stages of the land exchange proceeding, the
posture of the Board and Division carried strong implications
that legal "trust management" obligations compelled it to base
decision solely on a determination of whether exchange with
Garfield County would maximize economic return from the Capitol
Reef Section

[R. 32-36; R. 44-49; R. 54; R. 58]

Because that

position implied that no consideration could or would be given
to the potential impacts of the exchange on the scenic,
aesthetic and recreational values of that section or of Capitol
Reef National Park, NPCA sought to clarify the Board and
Director's interpretation of those "trust" obligations through
its declaratory ruling requests.

Request #7 sought a ruling

determining whether, under applicable law -decisions concerning the management, retention
and disposal of the state section . . . may
properly give preference to protection of
significant scenic, aesthetic, and recreational
values where such decisions may foreclose or
reduce prospects for greater monetary returns. .

. . [R. 71]
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The ruling request further sought to be advised of the extent
to which and the circumstances in which the Board or Division -will protect or preserve significant scenic,
aesthetic and recreational
values . . . (a) where
. . . decisions that may maximize monetary return
are likely to diminish, impair or destroy those
values; or (b) where . . . decisions involving
greater immediate or short-term monetary return
may foreclose or reduce prospects for longer-term
monetary benefits [from protecting those
values]. [R. 71]
B.

The Director's declaratory ruling on trust
management obligations

In response to NPCA's declaratory ruling request #7,
the Director determined that NPCA had demonstrated a sufficient
stake in resolution of the Capitol Reef land exchange to
justify a response.

Recognizing NPCATs interest in the

preservation or destruction of scenic, aesthetic and
recreational values, he concluded that "the relationship
between the feared impacts and NPCA's proferred [sic] interests
is sufficiently articulated to enable a limited ruling."

[R.

85]
The Director purported to limit his ruling to Utah
Code Ann. § 65-1-14 and other authorities only to the extent
necessary to determine the applicability of that section [R.
85], because NPCATs request had specifically identified only
that statute, together with "other applicable statutes,
constitutional provisions, rules or policies" that may govern
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protection of scenic, aesthetic and recreational values.
71]

[R.

The request was cast in those terms, however, because the

Division and board documents referring to the "trust
obligation" or duty to maximize economic return had not
identified specific statutory or constitutional sources in
asserting that obligation.
In any event, although the Director purported to limit
the scope of his ruling, it specifically and without
qualification asserted his interpretation of the provisions of
the Utah Enabling Act and Utah Constitution as they define the
source and reach of a "trust obligation" to maximize economic
return.
Although the Director's reply to NPCA's ruling against
#7 is not free from ambiguity, it may be summarized as follows:
(1)

Lands acquired by the State under the

"school section" grants in § 6 of the Utah Enabling Act, 28
Stat. 107, 109, were granted for the support of the public
schools and, pursuant to Article XX of the Utah Constitution,
are held in trust for that purpose.

As a trust asset, those

lands must be managed consistently with the trust purpose.
Although no specific standards are prescribed by law,
management of those trust lands must be consistent with the
trust purpose, which may not be subordinated to other
objectives.
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(2)

"School sections,Tf including the Capitol

Reef section, may be managed in accordance with other
applicable law so long as management is consistent with the
Enabling Act purpose.

Thus, "multiple use and sustained yield"

concepts prescribed by U.C.A. § 65-1-14 are applicable to
school trust lands including the Capitol Reef section, and
provide for management designed to preserve and protect
significant scenic, aesthetic and recreational values so long
as such management is consistent with the Enabling Act purpose
of providing support for the public schools by realizing
economic advantage from trust lands.
(3)

because the trust obligation runs to an

"open class" which includes future as well as present
beneficiaries, the trustee's duty includes conservation of
trust asset value to assure that present class members are not
unduly benefited at the expense of future class members.
Protection of non-economic values on trust lands, therefore,
will be consistent with trust requirements to the extent that
protective management properly serves to conserve trust asset
value for future class members.
(4)

Management for protection of scenic,

aesthetic and recreational values is permissible, and may even
be required, where those values support or are essential to

-31-

generating economic benefits from state school trust lands,
including the Capitol Reef section.
(5)

However, when there is a choice between two

actions, both of which provide some measure of economic benefit
to the school trust, management decisions may not prefer the
more protective option unless the Board or Director determines,
in their discretion, that it will generate the "greater
economic advantage."
C.

Only an Explicit, Factually-Demonstrable
Conflict With Trust Obligations Can Justify
Overriding Protective Statutory Policies

NPCA submits that the latter aspect of the Director's
interpretation of the trust obligation cannot be the law.
In an appropriate case, NPCA would contest those
aspects of the Director's ruling suggesting that other
statutory policies may never take priority over concepts of
trust management under the Enabling Act.

For purposes of this

case, however, it is necessary for NPCA to challenge only the
last element of his interpretation.
It is apparently the Director's position that even if
substantial economic benefits would arise from management
policies designed to protect unique scenic, aesthetic and
recreational values, and even if those protective policies are
authorized or mandated by federal or state statutes of general
application, the Board or Director may not select the more
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protective management option unless it will also generate "the
greater economic advantage."

Thus, under the Director's

ruling, even statutory protective policies that would generate
substantial economic gains may not be preferred or applied
unless they happen to coincide with the Board's or Director's
discretionary views of the "greater economic advantage."
Under this approach, then, even mandatory federal
policies against "impairment" or "derogation" of the purposes
and resources of national parks, proscribed by 16 U.S.C. § 1
and la-1, must apparently be disregarded if the Board or
Director, in their discretion, decide that greater economic
advantage lies in disregarding those policies.

Similarly,

under the Director's view of the "trust obligation," the
"multiple use/sustained yield" policies of Utah Code Ann. §
65-1-14, which ordinarily would call for special protection of
significant non-economic values, may play no role in the choice
of management strategies.
This approach claims too much discretion for the Board
or Director acting as "trustee".

Statutory requirements that

ordinarily control and limit the scope of agency authority may
be rendered ineffectual by the agencies' unexplained
determination that compliance with statutory standards may not
yield the "greater economic advantage."
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NPCA submits that the Director's interpretation of
the trust obligation cannot be the law.

The duty of faithful

management of state school lands cannot, through generalized
claims of uncontrolled administrative discretion, be converted
to a device for self-administered exemption from valid
legislative policies.
Statutory standards that provide for or require
protection of unique or significant values on state lands must
be interpreted as creating a legislative presumption that the
long-term value of the land exceeds any other economic return
that may be extracted from it.

For that reason, NPCA questions

whether trust duties in the management of state school sections
may ever be permitted to override lawful statutory standards
otherwise applicable to those lands.
At a minimum, however, if the presumption in favor of
statutory policies is ever to be overridden, the agencies
acting as trustee must be required to identify an explicit,
factually- demonstrable conflict between statutory provision
for resource protection and the obligations of trust
management.

In the absence of such a clear conflict, there can

be no legitimate basis for disregarding statutory protections.
(1)

Valid statutory policies and other
trust obligations provide for
protection of the significant scenic,
aesthetic and recreational values of
the Capitol Reef Section
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(a)

Under national park protection legislation

The significant scenic, aesthetic or recreational
values of the capitol Reef section were recognized and embraced
by statutory protection in 1971, when Congress included the
section "within the boundary generally depicted on the map"
establishing the boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park.

16

U.S.C.A. § 273 (1974), 85 Stat. 739 (Public Law 92-207, Dec.
18, 1971).

Inclusion within a national park obviously

constituted recognition that it is among "the most outstanding
natural and scenic outdoor areas" in the country.

House

Conference Report No. 92-685, 92 Cong. 1st Sess., 1971 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 2278, at 2280.

That recognition was

emphasized by the park Service's subsequent wilderness
recommendations for the area.

See supra, page 10-11.

Under the same statute's recognition of "valid
existing rights," of course, the state retained its Enabling
Act rights in the Capitol Reef section.

But its inclusion

within a unit of the National Park System embraced it, with
adjacent lands, within the statutory protections of the
National Park Service Organic Act, which provides for
regulation of the use of national parks in conformity with
their "fundamental purpose:"
to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wild life therein and to
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such
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manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations.
16 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1974) (Act of Aug. 25, 1916, 39 Stat. 535.)
That protection, made applicable to all units of the National
Park System, 16 U.S.C.A. § lc (1974), was further expanded by
1978 amendments which made the regulatory purpose explicit and
of broad application.
The 1978 amendments to Organic Act provided that "the
protection, management, and administration of these areas shall
be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of
the National Park System," and that activities in park units
shall not be authorized "in derogation of the values and
purposes for which these various areas have been established."
16 U.S.C.A. § ia-1 (West Supp. 1987).

Furthermore, the broad

reach of that amendment was emphasized by its legislative
history.

Without contest from dissenting senators, the key

committee report explicitly indicated that the amendment was
designed to resolve legal disputes about "competing private and
public values" not only in the parks but in surrounding areas:
This restatement of these highest principles of
management is also intended to serve as the basis
for any judicial resolution of competing private
and public values and interests in the areas
surrounding Redwood National Park and other areas
of the National Park System.
S.Rep. No. 95-528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8 (1977).
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Finally, these provisions have been recognized as
having protective effect beyond the formal boundaries of the
Parks, at least within in-holdings inside the parks' exterior
boundaries.

Free Enterprise Canoe Renters Assoc, v. Watt, 711

F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983) (sustaining regulations that barred
uncertificated, out-of-park canoe rental agencies from
utilizing county or state roads to launch canoes within the
exterior boundaries of Ozark National Scenic Riverways);
United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977)
(sustaining regulations that barred hunting on waters within
Voyageurs National Park in which Minnesota claimed ownership or
concurrent jurisdiction and on which state law expressly
continued to permit hunting).
(b)

Under Utah's multiple-use/sustained yield
policy

There can be no doubt that the Utah Legislature
intended that multiple-use/sustained yield principles would
govern management of school trust lands, for it specifically
provided in § 65-1-14 that those principles would govern, so
far as "consistent with school trust responsibilities."

On the

face of the statute, it is plain that multiple use principles
to be adhered to unless they are shown to be inconsistent with
"school trust obligations".
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There can also be little doubt that principles of
"multiple use/sustained yield," as defined in Utah Code Ann. §
65-1-1-4, provide for protection of unique and significant
lands of park quality as part of the "combination" of uses
"that will best meet the present and future needs of the people
of Utah."

Since there is no hint that park uses are not among

those to be so managed, the Board or Division would have to
offer a substantial justification for different treatment of
lands already recognized by Congress as qualifying for national
park protection.
That obvious conclusion is directly supported by the
Director's Declaratory Ruling on NPCAfs request #7.

He

explicitly acknowledges that the requirement of multiple use -suggests that the management and use of scenic,
aesthetic, and recreational resources on State
land might be granted status equal to economic
considerations in regard to the particular
Section 16, based on the statutory definition of
multiple-use/sustained yield. [R. 86; R. 87]
(Emphasis added.)
While the Director then interposes his views of the trust
obligation, he does not otherwise question the protection of
the Capitol Reef section under the multiple-use principles of
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-14.
(c)

A common law "trust obligation" to
protect unique natural values for the
benefit of the public imposes a burden
of specific justification for disposal
decisions
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In his influential 1970 article "The Public Trust
Doctrine In Natural Resource Law:

Effective Judicial

Intervention," 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (hereafter, Sax),
Professor Joseph L. Sax traced the development of
judicially-developed concepts of a "public trust doctrine"
which he found emerging in response to the environmental
problems created by "inconsistency in legislative response and
administrative action."

Sax at 474.

While Professor Sax did not purport to find a rigorous
and specific legal doctrine protecting public lands and
resources, he did explore a wide range of examples of judicial
skepticism toward government disposition of public interest
lands for the benefit of limited classes of beneficiaries.
Drawing from the celebrated public trust case of Illinois
Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892),
which had applied the doctrine to invalidate a deed to the Lake
Michigan water front originally granted by the Illinois
legislature, Sax found in that case "the central substantive
thought in public trust litigation:"
When a state holds a resource which is available
for the free use of the general public, a court
would look with considerable skepticism upon any
governmental conduct which is calculated either
to reallocate that resource to more restricted
uses or to subject public uses to the
self-interest of private parties.
Sax at 490.
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Pursuing that "model of judicial skepticism," Sax
found that: developed case law had taken positions requiring
clear and explicit justification for disposition of public
interest lands -- very like NPCATs contention here that
protective statutory standards must be respected in the absence
of a demonstrable conflicts between resource protection and the
specialized "school trust" obligation.

Thus, for example, he

found that: the Massachusetts court had developed a rule "that a
change in the use of public lands is impermissible without a
clear showing of legislative approval," Sax at 492, citing,
e.g., Gould v. Gaylock Reservation Commission, 350 Mass. 410,
215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).

Based on that initial requirement, he

found that the Massachusetts Court in Gould and subsequent
cases -has penetrated one of the very difficult problems
of American government -- inequality of access
to, and influence over, administrative agencies.
Sax at 498.

He found that the Court had followed up in

subsequent: cases that imposed a rigorous standard requiring
explicit legislative authorization for any administrative
actions invading the public interest in public preserves.

Id.

at 498 - 502, detailing the holdings in Robbins v. Department
of Public Works,

Mass.

, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969), and

Sacco v. Department of Public Works, 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d
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478 (1967).

And Sax found an essentially parallel development,

involving sophisticated and intensive scrutiny of
agency-proposed projects that may invade publicly-used lands or
waters, in the Wisconsin and California case law.

Sax at

509-524 and 524-546.
While he concludes that the courts will not
necessarily hold such dispositions illegal per se, Sax
emphasizes that
they do want to know what public purpose
justifies them, and they want to put legislatures
and administrators on notice that such
dispositions will be closely scrutinized and must
be reasonably justifiable in terms of the public
benefits to be achieved.
Sax at 564.
The "public trust" law continues to develop in
response to the continuing and accumulating conflicts between
protection of public preserves and the commodity demands of a
consumptive society.

Thus, in 1983, the California Supreme

Court confronted a classic example of those conflicts which,
like this case, involved an important clash between
preservation of scenic and ecological values and administrative
application of traditional legal doctrines supporting
consumptive use of resources.
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine
County, 33 Cal.3d 419, 189 Cal.Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709,
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718-724, 729 (Sup. Ct. Calif., en banc, 1983) pitted the unique
scenic beauty and ecological values of Mono Lake against the
traditional exercise of water appropriation doctrines,
administered through the agency of the California Water
Resources Board.

Recognizing both the important protective

policies underlying the public trust doctrine and the need for
exercise of legislative authority to permit diversion of water
for public purposes, the Court took a position very like that
urged by NPCA in this case:
Approval of such diversion without considering
public trust values, however, may result in
needless destruction of those values.
Accordingly, we believe that before state courts
and agencies approve water diversions, they
should consider the effect of such diversions
upon interests protected by the public trust, and
attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize
any harm to those interests.
33 Cal.3d 4

, 658 P.2d at 712.

Reviewing the substantial

body of California case law, the Court emphasized that even the
private beneficiaries of state conveyances of trust lands take
their interest "subject to the public trust."
722-23.

658 P.2d at

While the Court recognized that the California Water

Board could validly approve the contested water appropriations,
it emphasized that -the state has an affirmative duty to take the
public trust into account in the planning and
allocation of water resources, and to protect
public trust uses whenever feasible . . .
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and that no official body -has ever determined the impact of diverting the
entire flow of the Mono Lake tributaries into the
Los Angeles Aqueduct . . . [or] whether some
lesser taking would better balance the diverse
interests.
658 P.2d 728.

On that basis, the Court held the public trust

doctrine permitted both administrative and judicial
reconsideration and reallocation of prior water allocations
based on consideration of "the impact of water diversion on the
Mono Lake environment."

33 Cal.3d at 729, 658 P.2d at 729.

Whether viewed as setting a rigorous standard for
protection of public land values, or as a guide to rigorous
judicial skepticism, the underlying policies of the public
trust are clearly not met in this case.

Those policies cannot

be satisfied by the Board and Director's vague assertions of
"school trust" obligations, particularly where offered without
any meaningful or specific statement of the basis for
decision.

Nor can they be met while failing to consider the

statutory standards specifically protecting our national parks,
or state multiple use policies designed to facilitate
protection of the public's interest in those lands.
Finally, in view of the Board's disregard of its own
previously-adopted statement on "Management of Sensitive
Areas," and its disregard of the Governor's own Memorandum of
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Understanding, designed to facilitate exchanges between the
State and Interior Department that would protect national park
values, it is obvious that the Board's decision to convey the
Capitol Reef section to Garfield County did not fulfill the
Board's duty to protect public trust lands "whenever feasible."
(2)

The Director's interpretation is not
required by the established case law on
"trust" obligations for the management of
state school sections

Ironically, Article XX, §1 of the Utah Constitution,
on which the Director relies for his confining interpretation
of "school trust" obligations, may actually be the appropriate
basis for recognition of a broader "public trust" duty, at
least requiring that Board decisions respect the public
interest in unique noneconomic values on state school sections
"whenever feasible."

While § 6 of the Utah Enabling Act

unquestionably requires careful "trust" administration of funds
derived from the school lands, Article XX imposes a generalized
trust concept that fairly imports a general duty to protect the
public interest in lands acquired from Congress:
All lands of the State that have been, or may
hereafter be granted to the State by Congress .
. are hereby accepted, and declared to be public
Lands of the State; and shall be held in trust
for the people, to be disposed of as may be
provided by law, for the respective purposes for
which they have been or may be granted, donated,
devised or otherwise acquired. (emphasis added)
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Utah Const, art. XX, § 1.
Exploring the prospects for application of school
trust concepts compatibly with protection of noneconomic
environmental values, Professor McCormack has pointed out that
the acceptance of public lands

ff

in trust for the people11 "could

be read to grant the state flexibility to use school lands in a
broad public trust fashion, including nonrevenue uses, so long
as the lands are disposed of "as may be provided by law."

On

that basis, then, his interpretation "would distinguish between
the duty owed the school fund following disposition and the
duty owed the public while the lands remain in state
ownership."

W. McCormack, "Land Use Planning and Management of

State School Lands," 1982 Utah L. Rev. 525, at 532.
McCormack goes on to show that the confining case law
on which the Board and Director may be expected to rely deals
almost exclusively with disposal of trust lands, or income
from trust lands, for nonschool purposes.

Id., citing the

Supreme Court's holdings in Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S.
41 (1919) and Lassen v. Arizona Highway Department, 385 U.S.
458 (1967).
A more recent case to the same effect is State v.
University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807 (Alaska 1981).

The

provocation for the case involve management of school section
lands within a state park to deny a development right-of-way.
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But that focus was changed by the University- beneficiary's
intervention with a declaratory judgment claim challenging the
validity of the action of the Alaska legislature in
appropriating the land for a state park without land exchange
or other compensation.

624 P.2d at 810.

The Court's holding,

then, like Lassen and Ervien, was clearly based on the the
uncompensated disposal of trust lands.
A recent Colorado District Court case, drawing from an
1893 Colorado Supreme Court interpretation of a state
constitutional obligation similar to the Utah "trust" concepts,
has held that the constitutional obligation for the Colorado
State Board of

T

and Commissioners to maximize financial return

does not overriJe the state's Mined Land Reclamation Act.
Under a provision of that Act requiring conformity with local
zoning regulations, a mine operator was denied permission to
expand a mining operation on leased state land because the
local county determined that the expanded mining would violate
its zoning ordinance.

Wesley D. Conda, Inc. v. Colorado Mined

Land Reclamation Board, et al. (Case No. 86CV2812, Dist. Ct.,
City and County of Denver, decided 26 Jan. 1988), relying on
In re Leasing of State Lands, 18 Colo. 359, 32 P. 986 (1893).
Unlike Art. XX of the Utah Constitution, the Colorado
constitutional provision at issue in these cases expressly
provides that it is the duty of the land commissioners to
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ff

secure the maximum possible amount" for state lands acquired

from the United States.

Colo. Const. Art. IX, § 10.

But the

same provision also provides, like the similar Utah provision,
that the Commissioners1 duties are to be exercised "under such
regulations as may be prescribed by law."

Relying on that

constitutional recognition that statutory requirements may
regulate the exercise of the land management duties, both
Colorado decisions recognized that statutory controls could be
exercised so long as they did not seek to oust the agency's
ultimate control of the power of disposition of the state lands.
On review of the case law, McCormack properly
concludes that even where the state retains trust lands,
there is little in the [Lassen] opinion to
indicate that the state cannot define "fair
market" by reference to land use planning goals.
The whole concept of zoning and land use planning
presupposes that land values are affected by
planning decisions. . . .
1982 Utah L. Rev. 537.
In the context of the Capitol Reef land exchange, this
point is well taken:

none of the trust cases invalidate

interim management programs which may give weight or preference
to the protection of noneconomic values.

None questions the

propriety of comprehensive, calculated policies such as that
reflected in the Utah-Interior Department MOU which, if
implemented, would eliminate conflicts between protected
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national park lands and income production on school trust
lands.

Furthermore, none of the cases even raises doubt about

the propriety of proper planning for protection of noneconomic
values on unique school trust lands where conducted as part of
a comprehensive program designed to protect those values as an
inducement for tourist or other income producing activities on
trust lands outside the protected area.
Finally, McCormack properly points out that, far from
a violation of trust responsibilities -noneconomic management of school sections could
be asserted as a duty owed to the public school
system in some instances. Particular sections
may have historical values that should be
preserved to give future generations of school
children the opportunity to observe land and the
life it supports in a natural setting. . . .
[Tjhose arguments . . . are not far removed from
the duty of any trustee to conserve trust assets
in a prudent fashion. When reinforced by . . .
the Utah Constitution, which accepts state lands
1
in trust for the people,' those arguments
illustrate the potential breadth of management
obligations.

1982 Utah L. Rev. 537-38.

Obviously, that concept of an

affirmative duty to preserve unique lands for their special
value for future generations is significantly strengthened
where the land in question was specifically included by
Congress in national park lands set aside to be conserved
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"unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."

16

U.S.C.A. § 1 (1974).
(3)

Application of statutory standards to limit
the scope of agency discretion should not
be abandoned because the agency
characterizes itself as a "trustee"

Although both state and federal statutory standards,
applied with rigor under the oversight of public trust
concepts, would provide for agency protection of the unique
values of the Capitol Reef section, the Director's ruling lays
claim to a maze of "discretionary" judgments that would
pre-empt those statutory protections.

He recognizes that

protection may be appropriate where discretionary judgments
find the protective management.

Protective management may also

be appropriate where discretionary judgments find that
long-term "asset value" will be enhanced for future class
members.

Finally, the Director's ruling would overlay those

wide-ranging judgments with yet another crucial discretionary
judgment -- as to "greater economic advantage" -- for only with
that finding would statutory protections of noneconomic public
land values be given effect.
Despite the pre-emptive effect of this wide-ranging
claim of discretion, the Director offers virtually no hint of
the specific considerations that may weigh in favor or against
any of the critical findings.

Furthermore, that unconfined,
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unstructured, unchecked discretion would apparently be
exercised in the same manner as the Board's decision in the
instant case:

without findings or reasons that address either

the statutory requirements or the discretionary considerations
that govern particular decisions.
So far as may be discerned from the Board's decision
or the Director's decisions in either the land exchange or
declaratory ruling matters, the sole justification for this
extraordinary claim of supervening discretionary power lies in
the contention that the Board (or the Director) must exercise
the role of "trustee" under the "trust obligation" imposed on
the relevant land manager by the Utah Enabling Act.
Furthermore, as is more fully demonstrated in the sections
which follow, this approach is adopted in a context in which
virtually any rational choice in preferring one approach over
the other is hidden and thus invulnerable to meaningful review
or testing.
4.

Neither the Board Nor the Director Made
Factual or Legal Findings or Determinations
Necessary to Support Their Decision to
Approve the Capitol Reef Land Exchange

As this court pointed out in Milne Truck Lines v.
Public Service Commn., 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah, 1986),
administrative agencies cannot discharge their statutory
responsibilities without:
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. . . making findings of fact on all necessary
ultimate issues under the governing statutory
standards. It is also essential that the
Commission make subsidiary findings in sufficient
detail that the critical subordinate factual
issues are highlighted and resolved in such a
fashion as to demonstrate that there is a logical
and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions.
The importance of complete, accurate, and
consistent findings of fact is essential to a
proper determination by an administrative
agency. To that end, findings should be
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate factual conclusions, or
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached.
The record in this case shows no explanation
whatsoever explaining the Board or Division's reasons for
giving this land to the county.

As has been shown above, the

fact that the land in question lies within a national park
raises a set of legal and policy issues.

This land is subject

to unique statutory, administrative, and policy
considerations.

That backdrop of legal protection; coupled

with the proposition that the Board and Division's trust
obligations ought to make them highly skeptical about giving
away trust lands to further the short term objectives of
politically influential special interest groups; require some
statement of the basis for these decisions and actions.
The refusal of either the Board or Division to give
any such explanation is particularly offensive in this case
because as those entities proceeded, petitioner expressly and
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repeatedly brought to their attention those issues which they
have simply refused to address.
5.

The State Land Board Unlawfully Made or
Participated in the Decision to Approve the
County's Application for this Land Exchange

As has been demonstrated above, the administrative
record is virtually silent regarding what basis the Board or
Division actually relied on in deciding to give Garfield County
the land it requested.

The record does show, however, that the

only decision reflected in the record is that of the Board
rather than the Division.

The reasonable inference to be drawn

from this reccd is simply that the Board mandated the decision
to give this land to the county, and the Board allowed it to do
so.

Once again, the Board and Division have reversed the roles

they are empowered to perform under their enabling
legislation.
6.

Adkins, supra.
The Director Unlawfully Declined to Respond
to NPCA's Requests for Declaratory Rulings

On October 14, 1987, petitioner requested that the
Board or Division render nine declaratory rulings.
65-71].

[R.

Three days before causing the land in question to be

deeded to the county, the Division's director responded to
request No. 7 and declined to respond to all the other
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requests. [R. 83-87]

In responding to request No. 7, the

director conceded that:
With respect to request No. 7, the NPCA asserts
substantial interest without specifying what
those interests are. However, with the
accompanying Petition for Intervention, the NPCA
asserts with some particularity those injuries it
fears will be associated with the proposed land
exchange. Thus, although the form of the
petition is not in strict compliance with Rule
R632-7-4, NPCA has provided adequate information
relative to NPCAfs stake in the resolution to
allow a review of applicability to some extent.
R. 84, fifth paragraph.
The director then reviews in his next three paragraphs
petitioner's statement of its interests expected to be
adversely affected by the proposed exchange concluding:
". . . the relationships between the feared
impacts and NPCA's proffered interests is [sic]
sufficiently articulated to enable a limited
ruling/1 R. 85
In direct, and inexpliable contradiction, the director
claims in this same letter that he need not respond to requests
1 thru 6 because petitioner ". . . has provided inadequate
information to assure that responses to the requests are
necessary to protect or preserve NPCA's rights, status, or
legal relationships.f?

[R. 84]

These requests appear at record

pages 66-70, and petitioner contends that they may be fairly
summarized as requesting the Board and Division to subject
themselves to the discipline of objectively reviewing the
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September 11 Board decision approving the exchange "in
concept'1, given the apparent inconsistency of that decision
with the reasoning of Adkins v. Division of State Lands,
supra, or with §65-1-14 Utah Code.

Petitioner's interest in

these issues is indistinguishable from its interest in the
issue framed by request No. 7.

In each case, petitioner's

interest is the protection of national park lands from damage
resulting from an ill considered and unlawful transfer
apparently intended to serve short term political goals.
Petitioner's requests 8 and 9 sought certain further rulings
"in connection with the rulings requested in paragraph 7".
71].

[R.

This paragraph is identified as request No. 7 in the

director's December 21, 1987 response to these requests [R. 84]
and is referred to as request No. 7 throughout this brief.
While implicitly conceding that petitioner's interest in the
issues raised by these requests is indistinguishable from its
interest in the subject of request No. 7, the director declined
to respond to these requests.
Requests 8 and 9 asked the Division and Board to
evaluate and determine what weight ought to be given, in
analyzing the requested transfer, to the Board's policy
statement regarding "management of sensitive areas" (adopted
June 14, 1984, Appendix J to Petition for Review) and
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environmental assessments'1 (adopted July 19, 1978, Appendix K
to Petition for Review).
The director responded to these requests, first by
denying that "the Division" has any Surface Policy document

!t

.

. . providing for either management or sensitive areas or
environmental assessments."

[R. 84, third paragraph]

The

director then claimed that even if a Surface Policy document
did exist, such a policy could not be the subject of a
declaratory ruling because the policies are not statutes,
rules, or orders.

[R. 84, fourth paragraph]

The Surface Policy documents which appear as
appendices J and K to the Petition for Review show that each
was a policy recommended by the Division staff to the Board and
unanimously approved by the Board.

These types of policy

determinations are the proper function of the Board as
explained in Adkins, supra.
The director's overly technical construction of
§63-46a-15 is expressly refuted by the definitions which appear
in §63-46a-2.

§63-46a-2(10)(b) states:

it conforms to the definition of a rule."

"A policy is a rule if
§63-46a-2(13)(a)

defines a rule as an agency's written statement which has the
effect of law, implements a legal mandate, and applies to a
class of persons.

Given the role of the Board and Division as

interpreted and explained by the Adkins case, these written,
formally adopted policies meet that definition.
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7.

The Conveyance Pursuant to Invalid Agency
Action Should be Rescinded, and Proceedings
Should be Remanded With Instructions

§65-1-70, Utah Code, authorizes Utah's Governor to
execute and deliver patents pertaining to the state's lands
upon request of the Division of State Lands.

This

authorization is, of course, conditioned on a lawful request
from the Division.

A conveyance of real property by a state is

only valid if done with proper authority.

Cf State Land Board

v. Heuker, 548 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Ore. 1976); State v. Hatch,
342 P.2d 1103 (Utah, 1959); Thomas v. Daughters of Utah
Pioneers, 197 P 2d 497 (Utah, 1948).
As has been demonstrated above, this transfer lacked
proper authority and should be rescinded.
DATED this 30th day of June, 1988.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Chris Wangsgard
^ ^
Attorneys for Petitioner
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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